


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
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VIETNAM: North Vietnam, six months after the cease-fire, seems reasonably satisfied with the implementation of the agreement so far. This assessment emerges in a Foreign Ministry statement and a news interview given by the chief North Vietnamese negotiator, Le Duc Tho; both are relatively balanced in their treatment of the "positive" and "negative" aspects of the agreement.

On the positive side, Hanoi touts the "victory" achieved in the withdrawal of US military forces, in the return of Communist POWs, and in the consolidation of the Communist hold on the "liberated" areas of the South. Hanoi scores the continued fighting in the South as a negative factor and predictably blames it all on Saigon with US connivance. The negative aspects, however, are treated in a relatively low key, suggesting that Hanoi is not attempting at this time to build an excuse for a return to large-scale military operations.

In contrast with the tone set by Hanoi, there have been reports that key Communist officials in the South are disappointed with the gains made by their side since the cease-fire and are hopeful that Hanoi will return to a more militant policy. They will find little comfort in Hanoi's latest statements, which may, in fact, be designed to let the rank and file, North and South, know that Hanoi is prepared to live with the cease-fire accord for the time being. North Vietnam calls for continued adherence to the cease-fire by "all" parties, and while expressing confidence in ultimate victory by the Communist side, asserts that it will be a "protracted, hard, and difficult" struggle.

It is also clear from these statements that Hanoi is sensitive to the US position that the North Vietnamese must stop the fighting in the South and withdraw their forces from Laos and Cambodia before any agreement on US aid to North Vietnam can be

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reached. Le Duc Tho, for example, claims that these "preconditions" are a delaying tactic on the part of the US. Tho's relatively moderate language on the point suggests that Hanoi may eventually be willing to make concessions to the US stand. Recent moves by the Hanoi-dominated Communist side in Laos, which were designed to facilitate a political accord in that country, could be one sign of some North Vietnamese give.

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AFGHANISTAN: The composition of the new cabinet may be the result of a compromise between President Daud and the junior officers who last month staged the coup that brought him to power.

Daud, in whose name the coup was carried out, has taken the top posts of prime minister, foreign minister, and defense minister for himself, and he is expected to keep economic planning as well. The Deputy Prime Minister and several of the lesser ministers are known to be close to Daud.

25X1 [redacted] the junior officers active in the coup included Daud in their plans only at the last minute. Three of these officers as well as two civilians thought to be sympathetic to them have been given portfolios, including finance and interior.

The US ambassador in Kabul calls the cabinet a "peculiar hodgepodge" and doubts that it will be either very effective or capable of unified action. Daud is an old hand and may well be able to exploit the inexperience and disunity of his cabinet colleagues. In the longer run, his ability to stay on top may depend more on how effectively he deals with his country's many problems, and the cabinet that has been put together is unlikely to be of much help. [redacted]

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MALAYSIA: The sudden death of the ailing deputy prime minister, Tun Ismail, leaves Malaysia with a leadership gap that will be difficult to fill. Ismail's able and moderate leadership had a calming effect on racial tensions and intraparty feuding. He was Prime Minister Razak's most trusted lieutenant, and there is no one who can step in to handle his broad range of functions.

It will be particularly difficult for Razak to find someone to take Ismail's home affairs portfolio, a key job concerned with Malaysia's always sensitive communal relations. Few Malay politicians have the trust of the Chinese community that Ismail enjoyed. Razak will also be faced with the emergence of new rivalries within the major party, the United Malay Nationalist Organization, as several individuals have designs on the deputy prime ministership and on the deputy party presidency held by Ismail. The jockeying will intensify before a special party congress scheduled some time ago for November.

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Greece: A President and His Policies

George Papadopoulos' position has been strengthened, at least for a time, by the vote on 29 July that confirmed the new republic and made him president until June 1981. Key figures in the former military regime are now preoccupied with jockeying for position in the new government. Criticism of Papadopoulos' personal role will continue, however, and could still develop into a move by one or another of his colleagues to unseat him.

Papadopoulos worries about three broad categories of opposition forces:

--The least worrisome are the pre-revolutionary political leaders. The most vocal are in exile; they are a nuisance, not a threat. Many of them represent the extreme right or the extreme left of pre-revolutionary politics and have little or no following at home. More moderate politicians in this group, like former premier Karamanlis, are beginning to stir, and many cooperated prior to the plebiscite in urging a "no" vote. They have no leverage at all on the present government, and it will be a long time before they can hope to rally enough popular support--they would need an especially burning domestic issue--to make their presence felt.

--The second category is of more serious concern, but is one which Papadopoulos and his colleagues have so far been able to handle. This is an amorphous band of "super-revolutionaries" made up of younger officers of the Greek armed forces. They want to purify the revolution and carry it even further than their superiors.

--It is the third category, his comrades of the 1967 coup, that Papadopoulos must persuade or, more typically, outmaneuver if he is to stay

in power. The big four--Pattakos, Makarezos, Angelis, and Ioannides--control, either directly or through their subordinates, most of the units in the armed forces. Ioannides alone could make or break a putsch through his control of the military's internal security apparatus and his personal following among second-rank officers. Papadopoulos has been able to play his coup colleagues off against each other, and most of them would rather have him out in front anyway. They know, however, that he would prefer to rule without them, and they rankle at the inroads he is making into their individual and collective authority.

Most of the trouble Papadopoulos encountered during the pre-plebiscite period came from his colleagues within the junta. Although most of the military leaders favored the abolition of the monarchy and the creation of a republic, there was consternation among them when Papadopoulos moved so swiftly, leaving them no time to object to details of his plans. They dislike the idea that Papadopoulos gains even more power under the new republic, while theirs may be diminished substantially. Some senior military people--like Ioannides--fear that parliamentary elections will open the door to the influences their 1967 coup was intended to suppress.

They chafe most of all, however, over Papadopoulos' secrecy, which has separated them from the making of policy. Most of Papadopoulos' senior military colleagues agree that they must watch him closely and find a way to make their own influence felt more heavily on his decisions.

During the next month or so, Papadopoulos and his senior colleagues will be testing each other's strengths. They will also be reorganizing the government apparatus for the new republic. The Supreme Court will validate the 78.4-percent affirmative vote in the next two weeks. The formal complaints of opposition politicians over voting irregularities will undoubtedly be ignored. There will be minor institutional changes; for example, a constitutional court


may soon be set up to oversee the eventual formation of political parties. Extensive discussion over how many and what kind of parties should be allowed is probable. Some cabinet members may be installed in office, but the important posts will not be filled until fall. That should give Papadopoulos ample time to decide which of his military associates he can safely fire and which he must keep on.

Later in the fall, Papadopoulos will face renewed criticism from outside the regime. The students have promised to resume their agitation for educational reform. Their demonstrations last spring turned into an attack on the regime, and Papadopoulos' heavy-handed tactics were an embarrassment to many government leaders, including some key military officers. Inflation is another growing problem. Pro-test strikes could hit the big cities in consequence.

These and other problems may significantly weaken Papadopoulos' position. Military critics will almost certainly move to exploit all opportunities to preserve or enhance their positions at Papadopoulos' expense. In addition, having committed himself to elections in 1974, Papadopoulos will be under international pressure to meet that deadline. During the same period, resistance among the military to elections is likely to rise, and sometime before national elections actually take place Papadopoulos could face a concerted effort by his associates to bring him down. [REDACTED]

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


China-USSR: The Sino-Soviet trade agreement, signed in Moscow on 1 August, calls for the same level of trade as in 1972--\$250 million. The agreement covers Chinese purchases of 11 AN-24 aircraft and electric power equipment, which apparently will be installed by Soviet technicians.

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East Germany: The regime's official press organ announced on 3 August that the Palestine Liberation Organization will be allowed to open an office in East Berlin. The announcement adds weight to earlier speculation that the Palestinians would be permitted to open an office in exchange for their help in preventing terrorism against the Israeli delegation at the World Youth Festival now under way in East Berlin.

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**These items were prepared by CIA without consultation with the Departments of State and Defense.*

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